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INSOLVENCY PRINCIPLES AND THE 
ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE: THE MISSING 
LINK IN THE DEBATE 
A. MECHELE DICKERSON* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Politicians in this country, as well as many members of the international 
human-rights community, view it as fundamentally unfair that the Iraqi people 
may be saddled with the debts Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime incurred. 
Further, some in the human-rights community generally argue that rich 
(creditor) countries have a moral duty or obligation to protect citizens of poor 
(debtor) countries and that richer nations should forgive the debts of poorer 
nations to help reduce existing inequalities between developed and developing 
countries. Until recently, arguments that successor governments should not be 
forced to repay the debts of former leaders or regimes relied almost exclusively 
on philosophical or humanitarian grounds. This article joins the attempt by 
scholars in the insolvency community to shift the discussion from the human 
rights, to the insolvency, arena. 
The article does not attempt to outline a framework that should be used to 
determine whether a debt should be declared odious nor does it propose any 
specific entity that should have the authority to determine the odiousness of a 
debt. Instead, the article evaluates the doctrine of odious debts using the 
insolvency framework found in the United States Bankruptcy Code. Part II of 
the article provides a brief overview of sovereign lending and notes that entities 
that lend to, or invest in, sovereigns understand ex ante that many of the typical 
creditor remedies available upon default (such as repossession of collateral and 
replacement of managers) simply are not available in the context of sovereign 
lending. Since sovereigns are atypical debtors, their debt restructurings do not 
resemble the typical insolvency proceeding or out-of-court workout that involve 
business debtors. 
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Part III of the article then briefly describes the odious debt doctrine, 
discusses instances when it has been invoked to allow a sovereign to repudiate 
its debts, and briefly discusses the Iraqi debt situation. In considering what 
obligations a sovereign should have to repay a former regime’s debts, the article 
emphasizes that even sovereigns who refuse to repay their debts cannot be 
liquidated and political leaders who refuse to repay the sovereign’s debts cannot 
be replaced by lenders (at least not without military assistance). Thus, like 
consumers and businesses that reorganize in bankruptcy, financially troubled 
sovereigns will continue to exist notwithstanding their financial crises. 
The article concludes by discussing instances where businesses are allowed 
to repudiate promises made to groups typically favored in our society 
(employees), are allowed to discharge debts owed to favored (often 
governmental) creditors, or, are allowed to subordinate certain creditor claims. 
Since debt restructuring is designed to rehabilitate people and businesses and to 
allow them to perform their core functions, courts allow debtors to break these 
promises if forcing debt repayment will prevent a business from rehabilitating 
itself in bankruptcy. The article argues that sovereign-debt restructurings 
should focus on the need both to rehabilitate the sovereign’s finances and to 
allow the new leaders to perform the sovereign’s principal “business” functions. 
Since the “business” of a sovereign is principally to provide for the needs of its 
citizens and to maintain the country’s physical infrastructure, and a 
democratically elected government will be ineffective if it lacks the respect of its 
citizens or is unable to provide essential health and human welfare services for 
those citizens, it would be justifiable to forgive odious debts if forcing the 
sovereign to repay those debts would prevent the sovereign from restructuring 
itself politically and financially. 
Finally, the article notes that an additional benefit to periodical invocation 
of the odious debt doctrine is that it reminds lenders that the doctrine may at 
some point gain acceptance in the international financial community. Though 
the doctrine may not ever be acknowledged by the lending community, 
creditors (like some involved in the Iraqi debts restructuring) will be forced to 
bargain during the restructuring in the shadow of the threat that the doctrine 
might be invoked and this fear may make some commercial lenders exercise 
more caution in the future when extending credit to regimes. 
II 
SOVEREIGN-DEBT LENDING 
A. Private or Public Sector 
Although most of the Iraqi debt is owed to other sovereigns,1 sovereign debt 
generally is either held by domestic entities or by external private-sector 
 
 1. Martin A. Weiss, Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential Implications for International 
Debt Relief, Congressional Research Service, Apr. 21, 2006, at 1–2, fig. 1. 
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creditors.2 Private-sector sovereign lending generally has vacillated over the last 
two centuries between bank and bond lenders. Bond lending was the dominant 
form of private-sector, sovereign-debt financing in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, while bank lending became the norm for most of the 
twentieth century. Indeed, commercial banks (largely through medium- to long-
term, syndicated bank-loan agreements) were the principal participants in 
sovereign lending until the 1990s. In the 1990s, sovereign-debt financing 
changed dramatically largely because of losses banks sustained in the Latin 
American financial crisis. Starting in the 1990s, the debts sovereigns owed to 
banks significantly decreased, and now most sovereign debt (whether domestic 
or external private-sector external) is bond debt.3 
Most sovereign lending is unsecured. Moreover, even when the lending 
ostensibly is secured, sovereign lenders have significantly fewer options upon 
default than lenders to commercial entities (or to individuals) possess.4 In 
general, sovereign lenders cannot exercise the same rights upon default that 
lenders can exercise when the defaulting debtor is a business or a person. For 
example, even if a lender has a security interest in the sovereign’s oil revenue or 
exports, if the sovereign fails to repay the loan, the lender cannot “seize” or 
otherwise take over the sovereign nor can it easily seize control of oil wells or 
products located within the sovereign. Indeed, even using the judicial process to 
enforce its right to repayment likely will prove difficult for lenders who seek to 
sue a sovereign for repayment. If the lender sues in a sovereign court, it is 
unlikely that that court would rule in favor of the lender. Suing the sovereign in 
another country may not be permitted because sovereign immunity generally 
protects nation-states from suit unless they consent. Even when sovereigns have 
consented to suit, they generally are sued only in a limited number of other 
nations (generally, the United States and the United Kingdom). And, even if 
the lender is allowed to sue the sovereign, the success of the litigation depends 
largely on the lender’s ability to locate the sovereign’s assets and to sue before 
the sovereign has time to move the assets to another location.5 
 
 2. Kevin Cowan et al., Sovereign Debt in the Americas: New Data and Stylized Facts, Inter-
American Development Bank, Oct. 2006, at 14, 35, fig. 6, available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/ 
wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=846330; Paris Club, Fifty Years of Orderly Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, Proceedings of the International Policy Forum, June 14, 2006, at 21, available at 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/cdp/sections/50-ans/anglais_071206web-pdf/downloadFile/file/ 
anglais_071206web.pdf?nocache=1170431715.92. 
 3. Cowan et al., supra note 2; A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1012 (2004); Paris Club, supra note 2. See generally Joseph J. 
Norton, International Syndicated Lending and Economic Development in Latin America: The Legal 
Context, 9 ESSAYS IN INT’L FIN. & ECON. L. 7–8, 10–12 (1997). 
 4. Dickerson, supra note 3, at 1008. 
 5. See Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 177, 192–93 (2005) (discussing creditor attempts to seize Argentina’s U.S.-based assets, 
including military assets and payments to its embassy); Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or 
Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1084–88 
(discussing difficulties creditors face in suits against sovereigns). 
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Lenders to sovereigns are also prohibited from exercising a remedy that 
lenders to commercial entities increasingly use: forcing the debtor to replace its 
management team.6 Lenders routinely condition debt forgiveness (or future 
lending) on the willingness of the firm’s board of directors to fire existing 
managers or to make other drastic management changes.7 In contrast, without 
the support of a well-armed military of their own,8 sovereign lenders lack the 
ability to oust a sovereign’s political leaders and install new leaders if the 
current leaders refuse to repay the creditor’s debts. 
B. International Financial Institutions 
In general, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lends to sovereigns 
when private lenders will make loans only on the terms prevailing in the capital-
markets. The IMF often lends in its capacity as an international development 
institution that provides humanitarian aid,9 rather than as a financial institution 
whose lending decisions are based on a debtor’s creditworthiness or borrowing 
capacity. Some members of the financial community criticize this lending 
practice, contending that IMF lending creates a moral-hazard problem by 
encouraging sovereigns to borrow recklessly (knowing that an IMF bailout is 
likely) and by encouraging creditors to lend recklessly (knowing that the same 
bailout will ensure repayment of those imprudent loans).10 Human-rights 
activists also criticize IMF lending and policies and accuse the IMF and the 
World Bank11 of knowingly lending to repressive regimes who illegally divert 
the loan proceeds or use the funds in ways that affirmatively harm the 
countries’ citizens.12 
 
 6. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1228 (2006); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth 
and Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 843 (2004). 
 7. Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 93 (2004); 
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 1228; Westbrook, supra note 6, at 843. 
 8. And, as the current controversy over, and decreasing public support for, the war in Iraq shows, 
the lender also would need the support of the people who are funding the effort to oust a political 
leader. 
 9. The IMF is an international organization of 184 member countries established to promote 
international monetary cooperation and exchange stability, to foster economic growth, and to provide 
temporary financial assistance to countries that are experiencing balance of payments difficulties 
caused by, for example, budget deficits, inflation, or currency valuation problems. International 
Monetary Fund, Article I—Purposes, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa01.htm (last visited June 
30, 2007). 
 10. Some critics suggest that the IMF should focus on providing short-term emergency lending to 
sovereigns who face a liquidity crisis rather than acting as a lender of last resort that essentially bails 
out the sovereign (and its lenders) or otherwise creates a moral-hazard problem by giving sovereigns an 
incentive to engage in opportunistic borrowing. Dickerson, supra note 3, at 1010 n.53. 
 11. In general, the World Bank provides finance and advice to developing nations to help them 
with their economic development, to help them reduce poverty, and to encourage and safeguard 
international investments in those developing nations. The World Bank, About Us – History, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20653660~menuP
K:72312~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited June 30, 2007). 
 12. Salil Tripathi, The Corruption Crusader, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Mar. 13, 2006,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1730009,00.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). 
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C. Default 
1. Generally 
To remedy a financial crisis, some sovereigns may choose to 
opportunistically default rather than raise taxes or radically cut public services 
for health care or education.13 Though this option is always available, few 
sovereigns appear to willingly default or to otherwise indicate that they are 
repudiating their financial obligations. Sovereigns appear to avoid repudiating 
their debts or seeking a predefault debt restructuring because this might signal 
that they are not creditworthy and such a signal would hurt their reputation in, 
and access to, international capital markets.14 In addition, even if the sovereign’s 
leaders decide to repudiate its financial obligations, the restructuring process is 
necessarily a political one that will force leaders to negotiate with all groups 
(both domestic and external) affected by the debt restructuring. Leaders 
understandably resist restructurings that cause economic dislocation since they 
understand that overly burdening the country to repay debts may trigger a 
recession, force severe cuts in public expenditures on social programs, or force 
them to increase taxes. Leaders who are democratically elected justifiably avoid 
taking any of these actions because such actions would cause political upheaval 
and may threaten their political careers by giving citizens an incentive to oust 
them during the next election cycle. 
2. Debt-Restructuring Procedures 
Nations are often thwarted in their efforts to repudiate or radically reduce 
their debts because there is no uniform international statute, convention, or 
treaty that governs sovereign-debt restructurings. Despite recent discussions of 
an IMF-sponsored “sovereign debt restructuring mechanism,” international 
financial institutions (IFIs), capital market lenders, and debtor-states thus far 
have all rejected any attempt to create a permanent sovereign-debt-
restructuring mechanism.15 Instead, sovereigns who are in default must use a 
multi-step procedure to restructure their debts. 
a. Official multilateral or bilateral debt. 
Sovereigns can reschedule debts they owe to other sovereigns (official 
bilateral debt) through an informal arrangement known as the Paris Club.16 The 
Paris Club is an informal group of creditor governments from major 
industrialized countries that meets monthly (in Paris) to help debtor nations 
restructure their debts. The restructuring procedures used in Paris Club 
 
 13. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 5, at 1048–51. 
 14. Dickerson, supra note 3, at 1007. While Argentina and Ecuador appear to have faced difficulty 
getting credit on the capital markets due to their recent defaults, they have been able to issue bonds for 
the Venezuelan government. Overseas Development Institute, Re-examining Sovereign Debt: 
Forgiveness and Innovation, Sept. 2006, at 4. 
 15. Weiss, supra note 1, at 11; Paris Club, supra note 2, at 25. 
 16. The Paris Club, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ (last visited June 30, 2007). 
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negotiations are generally viewed as closed and not at all transparent. The Paris 
Club members will recommend to their countries that they reduce the debts 
owed to them only if the IMF has certified that the debtor country cannot meet 
its debt-service obligations, the debtor country agrees to comply with certain 
policy changes specified by the IMF, and the debtor agrees that it offer terms to 
commercial creditors that are not more generous than the terms it negotiated 
with the Paris Club.17 Sovereigns and their official creditors tend to reach 
agreements quickly (and relatively inexpensively) in a Paris Club rescheduling 
and Paris Club restructurings tend to be “successful” largely because public 
creditors are willing to make concessions based on geopolitical, nonfinancial 
considerations.18 
b. Commercial debt. 
Private negotiations between sovereigns and their private commercial bank 
lenders often occur in an arrangement known as the London Club. London 
Club negotiations, in contrast to those conducted during a Paris Club 
restructuring, tend to be lengthier and more expensive. Various reasons are 
cited for why London Club negotiations are not as efficient as Paris Club 
restructurings. First, unlike the relatively limited number of creditor 
governments involved with Paris Club restructurings, the considerably larger 
number of commercial creditors involved in London Club negotiations makes 
reaching an agreement with anything close to unanimous creditor consent 
(which is required) difficult. In addition, unlike official public creditors, 
commercial entities are less likely to forgive debt merely to solidify future or 
geopolitical relationships with the defaulting sovereign.19 
3. Role of IFIs 
While sovereigns and their public or private creditors are attempting to 
restructure a sovereign’s debts, the sovereign often needs working capital. IFIs 
are asked (and often expected) to offer new loans to the sovereigns. When the 
IMF is the IFI, the loans are conditioned on the sovereign’s agreement to 
reform certain economic policies. In addition to the reasons noted earlier, IMF 
lending is controversial because many believe the IMF makes loans based on 
the economic or political desires of its politically powerful members (often the 
United States). These creditor nations, some suggest, insist on an IMF bailout 
to protect loans made by the nations’ domestic banking institutions or demand 
 
 17. Weiss, supra note 1, at 9. As an example, Malawi’s debts were substantially reduced (from U.S. 
$363 million to U.S. $9 million) on October 19, 2006 after it completed requirements imposed by the 
IMF initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. Specifically, after Malawi agreed to implement 
a poverty-reduction strategy and an economic program designed to encourage sustainable economic 
growth, the Paris Club members agreed to cancel U.S. $137 million and to grant additional debt relief 
of U.S. $217 million to Malawi. Paris Club, News - Malawi, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/ 
traitements/malawi-20061019/switchLanguage/en (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). 
 18. Dickerson, supra note 3, at 1008–09. 
 19. Id. at 1009. 
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that the IMF provide support packages to countries for geopolitical rather than 
economic reasons.20 
The World Bank and IMF also provide debt relief to low-income countries 
through the Debt Relief Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (the 
HIPC Initiative) and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). Debtor 
nations are eligible for the HIPC Initiative if they meet certain income and 
indebtedness criteria. Eligible nations also must have a current track record of 
satisfactory performance under an IMF program, a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS), or an interim PRS in place, and an agreed plan to clear any arrears to 
foreign creditors. In general, the HIPC Initiative requires all creditors 
(multilateral, bilateral, or commercial) to help provide a fresh start to debtor 
nations and to help those nations reduce poverty. Once debtor nations 
accomplish certain goals and reach what is known as “the completion point,” 
the debt relief then becomes irrevocable.21 
Some critics argue that, despite the program’s good intentions, it is 
inadequate because it does not force debtor nations to adequately reduce 
poverty or provide basic health care and education for their citizens, and that 
countries whose debts are restructured (or forgiven) still remain insolvent and 
continue to suffer substantial shortages of capital.22 Finally, critics maintain that 
the HIPC Initiative does not allow debtor nations to repudiate odious debts if 
they ostensibly have the ability to repay the debts. 
III 
ODIOUS DEBTS 
Many liberal and conservative organizations, both domestically and 
internationally, argue that the insolvency process used to resolve the debt crises 
of poor nations should be guided by noneconomic factors and that considering 
these factors would result in debt cancellation, not simply restructuring. That is, 
many outside of the financial community maintain that any insolvency 
framework involving sovereign debts should be based on principles related to 
 
 20. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Role of the IMF in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 287, 
300 (2005). 
 21. In general, the debtor country must agree on a short list of completion-point triggers, which 
typically includes a continued track record of satisfactory performance on an IMF program; successful 
implementation of its poverty reduction strategy; and progress in improving health and education, 
governance, or fighting corruption. In essence, debt relief becomes irrevocable only when the debtor 
nation has made changes to give its creditors sufficient confidence that the debt relief will not be futile. 
The World Bank, News & Broadcast, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/ 
0,,contentMDK:20040942~menuPK:34480~pagePK:34370~theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited June 30, 
2007). 
 22. Africa Action, Critique of the HIPC Initiative, http://www.africaaction.org/action/hipc0206.htm 
(last visited June 30, 3007); ANN PETTIFOR, CHAPTER 9/11? RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DEBT 
CRISES—THE JUBILEE FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 9 (2002), available at 
http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads/9-11.pdf. 
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justice, morality, and human rights23 and that the citizens of the debtor 
sovereign should be given the opportunity to help resolve the sovereign’s 
financial crisis and help prevent future crises in a transparent, democratically 
accountable framework. Given these views, it is perhaps not surprising that 
much of the discussion of the treatment of odious debts has taken place in the 
international human-rights—not the insolvency—arena. 
A. Origins, and an Explanation, of the Odious Debt Doctrine 
Because of the public international law concept of state succession, a new 
government remains liable for the debts of its predecessor governments. Thus, 
whether the sovereign’s political leaders are replaced as the result of a 
democratic process, a violent overthrow, or a war, the new government remains 
obligated to repay debts to its private, official bilateral, or international-
organization creditors. Successor governments remain liable for the old 
regime’s debts because of the view that those debts represent obligations of the 
state—not the debts of any particular political party or leader.24 
Since a sovereign should incur only those debts that are in its interests, a 
number of political theorists, human-rights groups, and religious organizations 
reject the notion that a country should be forced to repay debts that were not 
incurred in the sovereign’s interests.25 The odious debt doctrine provides an 
exception to the general rule that successor governments remain liable for a 
prior regime’s debts. In general, debts are considered odious if a despotic or 
autocratic leader or regime borrowed the money but did not use it to benefit 
the country’s citizens and the creditors knew that the funds would be used to 
benefit the corrupt leaders or to finance harmful activities like genocide and 
other human-rights violations. In its earliest formulation, the doctrine provided 
that when an autocratic or despotic regime borrows to strengthen its reign or to 
repress the citizens of the country—not to provide for the needs or interest of 
the sovereign—then, if and when the despot goes, so should the debt.26 Such 
 
 23. Africa Action, supra note 22 (argument by Africa advocacy group that many of the debts of 
African nations are illegitimate and should be cancelled); Nile Gardiner & Marc Miles, Forgive the 
Iraqi Debt, The Heritage Foundation, Apr. 30, 2003, available at http://www.heritage.org/ 
Research/TradeandForeignAid/em871.cfm (discussing the economic and moral imperative of forgiving, 
not restructuring, the Iraqi debt); PETTIFOR, supra note 22, at 4. 
 24. Sean Hagan, The IMF’s Role in a Post-Conflict Situation, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 59, 59–60 
(2006); NANCY BIRDSALL & JOHN WILLIAMSON, DELIVERING ON DEBT RELIEF: FROM IMF GOLD 
TO A NEW AID ARCHITECTURE 52 (2002). 
 25. For an example, Jubilee USA—the U.S. arm of the international organization Jubilee 
Research—is a network of more than seventy religious or faith groups (including the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America, the Mennonite Central Committee, the Presbyterian Church USA, and 
the Sisters of the Holy Cross), environmental and labor organizations, community groups, and research 
institutes. Jubilee USA engages in public education and research and policy analyses that advocate debt 
cancellation for impoverished countries. See Jubilee USA Network, Who is Jubilee USA?, 
http://www.jubileeusa.org/jubilee.cgi?path=/about_the_network/member_organizations&page=who_ar
e_we.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
 26. See Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
391, 403 (2005) (discussing historical development of the concept); Alexander N. Sack, Les Effets des 
Transformations des Etats sur leurs Dettes Publiques et Autres Obligations Financieres, in ODIOUS 
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debts should be treated as personal debts of the former despot (or regime), not 
as an obligation of the current regime or the citizens of the sovereign. To do 
otherwise, it is argued, would force people to pay for their own repression.27 
Under this doctrine, creditors (including IFIs) with knowledge that a 
political leader incurred debts to strengthen his regime, to repress political 
opponents, or to serve manifestly personal interests unrelated to the sovereign’s 
interests would not be entitled to full repayment of those debts. Because such a 
debt was designed to benefit only the governing regime, not the citizens of the 
sovereign, under most formulations of the odious debt doctrine, the new regime 
would have the burden of proving that the prior regime’s debts did not serve 
the interest of the sovereign and that the creditors had knowledge of how the 
funds were being used. If the creditors failed to rebut proof that the funds were 
not used to benefit the sovereign, then the debt would be deemed 
unenforceable.28 
Some human-rights activists argue for a broader conceptualization of the 
doctrine whereby, in addition to the cancellation of odious debts, all 
“illegitimate debt” should be cancelled.
 
29  That is, loans would be cancelled if 
they were against the law or not sanctioned by applicable law; were unfair, 
improper or objectionable; or infringed public policy. Others argue that any 
debts of developing nations that arose because of “bad” lending policies or 
practices by private lenders or creditor nations should be written off.30 
 
DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165 
(Patricia Adams trans., 1991), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP= 
content&ContentID=7759 (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
 27. Or, as stated by an Iraqi political leader, lenders who demand that Iraq repay Saddam 
Hussein’s debts are, in essence, asking them “to pay for the knives they gave Saddam to slaughter us.” 
Jubilee Iraq, http://www.jubileeiraq.org/files/iraqiviews.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
 28. PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD 
WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY ch. 17, available at http://www.probeinternational.org/probeint/ 
OdiousDebts/OdiousDebts/chapter17.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2006). 
 29. Africa Action, supra note 22 (argument by Africa advocacy group that many of the debts of 
African nations are illegitimate and should be cancelled); Joyce Mulama, Debt the Illegitimate Legacy 
of Africa’s Dictators, IPS NEWS, Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://www.zmag.org/content/ 
showarticle.cfm?ItemID=11957 (reporting discussions at 2007 World Social Forum meeting where 
attendees characterized debts of poor countries as illegitimate); Paris Club, supra note 2, at 21, 62 
(statement of advocacy officer for Eurodad: “It is high time that creditors take responsibility for their 
acts, acknowledge the existence of illegitimate debts and cancel them unconditionally.”). 
 30. For example, one commentator suggests that the following debts should be deemed 
illegitimate: loans made to known corrupt officials; loans for “obviously bad projects”; and loans with 
usurious interest rates. JOSEPH HANLON, DEFINING ILLEGITIMATE DEBT AND LINKING ITS 
CANCELLATION TO ECONOMIC JUSTICE (2002), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/ 
publications/DefiningIllegtimateDebt.pdf. 
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B. Invocation of the Doctrine of Odious Debts 
1. Early Use of the Odious Debt Doctrine 
Human-rights activists concede that the notion of allowing a successor 
regime to repudiate debts incurred by prior regimes is controversial.31 Human-
rights scholars stress, though, that the United States was one of the first nations 
to rely on the doctrine to refuse to repay debts. For example, after the United 
States won the Spanish-American War and seized Cuba from Spain, Spain 
demanded that the United States repay Cuba’s debts to Spain. The United 
States refused this demand—not because the debts imposed an excessive 
burden on it—but because the loans had been imposed on the citizens of Cuba 
without their consent. Moreover, the United States contended that Spain 
understood the risky nature of lending to Cuba ex ante. In applying the concept 
of odious debts (and, consequently, refusing to pay Cuba’s debts), the United 
States essentially argued that forcing Cuba to repay these debts would have 
perpetuated Spain’s oppression of the Cuban people.32 
Another such example was a 1923 arbitration involving debts owed a 
Canadian lender by Costa Rica. Former President and U.S. Supreme Court 
Chief Justice William H. Taft was the sole arbitrator in this dispute. Justice Taft 
initially reaffirmed the basic principle that successor governments are required 
to repay the debts of their predecessors. But he concluded that Costa Rica 
could unilaterally repudiate the debt owed to the lender because the loan had 
been incurred not to benefit Costa Rican citizens but to finance the leader’s 
(and his brother’s) escape from Costa Rica and because the lender knew (or 
should have known) those intentions.33 
2. Recent Demands to Apply the Doctrine 
The crisis in Iraq and the burgeoning costs associated with the war there 
have increased the interest of U.S. politicians in the odious debt doctrine and 
have renewed the call in the international human-rights community for the 
recognition and application of the doctrine to the mounting Iraqi debt. While 
everyone understood that some of the Iraqi debt had to be cancelled, some 
commentators suggested that no future Iraqi government should be forced to 
repay any of the debts associated with Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime.34 The 
 
 31. One critic characterized the doctrine as “an indeterminate, doctrinal impediment to the 
reemergence of a local economy in the global markets . . . .” Hiram Chodosh, Rebuilding Nation 
Building: An Introduction, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2006). 
 32. ADAMS, supra note 28, at ch. 17; Ed Kinane, Don’t Saddle Iraqi People with Saddam’s Bloody 
Debts, POST-STANDARD, Dec. 18, 2005, at D1. 
 33. Gelpern, supra note 26, at 411 (describing arbitration proceeding). 
 34. Bill Day, The Burden of Odious Debt, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 27, 2003, at 2H; 
Frida Ghitis, Iraq Burden; Where Credit Was Overdue . . ., CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 2004, at C1; Editorial, 
Iraq’s Debt Must Be Forgiven, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 23, 2003, at B7; Editorial, Iraq’s 
Odious Debts, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 22, 2003, at 4; Maura Reynolds, Bush Taps Baker for Iraq Task; 
The Former Secretary of State and Longtime Family Ally Is Named a Presidential Envoy. His Job Is to 
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current Bush Administration appears to have helped convince other nations to 
forgive billions of Iraq’s debts based, in part, on the Administration’s concern 
that Hussein used the money to buy arms or build castles.35 Other recent 
invocations of the doctrine on the Iraqi citizens’ behalf include legislation 
introduced in Congress that would have encouraged the IMF and World Bank 
to waive much of the debt incurred during the Hussein regime and legislation 
involving proposed aid to Iraq.36 
No one seems to know (or is willing to admit) the total amount of Iraq’s 
foreign debt obligations.37 When Saddam Hussein gained power in Iraq in 1979, 
the amount of Iraq’s long-term foreign debt was insignificant, and it had cash 
reserves of $36 billion. But costs associated with Hussein’s invasion of Iran 
(with the blessing of the United States) and his invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
significantly increased Iraq’s debts. Most agree that much of that debt is owed 
to other countries (most notably, France, Russia, and other Arab nations).38 In 
addition to the borrowing during Hussein’s regime, Iraq’s debts continue to 
mount because of the remaining unpaid Gulf War reparation claims filed with 
the United Nations Compensation Commission based on the damage Hussein 
(and, thus, Iraq) inflicted on Kuwait, its oil fields, and Kuwaiti citizens. The 
amount of external debts tied to Hussein’s regimes is estimated to be $125 
billion, though some reports suggest it might actually exceed $200 billion.39 And, 
it is too early to determine how much it will cost to rebuild Iraq whenever the 
war ends or to quantify the amount of lost development efforts associated with 
the ongoing war. In addition to the costs to finance the physical infrastructure 
that has been destroyed during the war, the new Iraqi government will also face 
massive costs involving the health, education, and general welfare needs of the 
Iraqi people. 
 
Sway Creditors to Ease the War-Torn Nation’s Steep Debt, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2003, at A1; Craig S. 
Smith, Baghdad Bank Plundered as Iraq’s Economy Falters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at B1. 
 35. Editorial, Keeping Iraqi Elections on Track, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2004, at C20; 
David R. Francis, Sweet Victory Ahead on Debt Relief?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 2, 2005, at 17. 
 36. Senator Evan Bayh commenting on the rationale behind the legislation, stated, “[I]f you do 
business by extending loans to dictators, you assume the risk of nonrepayment in the event that those 
dictators are overthrown. This is truly ‘odious debt,’ to use the term employed by international lawyers. 
The Iraqi people have the right to repudiate this debt. If they do not, the other nations that incurred it 
surely should do the right thing by forgiving it.” 149 Cong. Rec. S12673 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2003) 
(statement of Sen. Bayh). Ironically, the purpose of this amendment was to convert a grant into a loan 
because of Sen. Bayh’s concern that it would be unfair for Russia, France, Germany, and other nations 
to be repaid (since they “propped up the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein”) while the United 
States received nothing. See id. 
 37. Paul Blustein, G-7 Agrees That Iraq Needs Help With Debt; Important Roles Seen for IMF, 
World Bank, WASH. POST., Apr. 13, 2003, at A37; Weiss, supra note 1, at 1–2 (discussing disagreements 
on what Iraq owes and how interest on that debt should be calculated). 
 38. Weiss, supra note 1, at 1. 
 39. Reynolds, supra note 34, at A1; Smith, supra note 34, at B1; Editorial, Iraq’s Debt Must Be 
Forgiven, supra note 34, at B7; Weiss, supra note 1, at 1–2. Not surprisingly, nations that lent to Iraq—
especially those that helped finance the war with Iran—are not forthcoming about the amounts they are 
owed or the nature of the lending. Jim Hoagland, Iraq Is One Place Where Sanctions Might Work, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1988, at A25. 
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Just as U.S. politicians, scholars, and members of the human-rights 
community argue that Iraq should not be forced to repay Hussein’s odious 
debts, the relatively recent debts of several other nations are also arguably 
subject to the odious debt doctrine. At the end of the brutal apartheid regime in 
South Africa, the human-rights community also argued that the apartheid-era 
debts should be forgiven because of their odious nature. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission campaigned for apartheid-era debts to be written 
off since so many of the loan proceeds were used to oppress black South 
Africans and to finance the apartheid military and police state. The new South 
African leaders did not repudiate the debts, most likely because they were 
concerned that doing so would harm the country’s ability to attract foreign 
investment.40 Likewise, perhaps for similar reasons, despite the suspect nature of 
loans incurred by “Baby Doc” Duvalier of Haiti, Ferdinand Marcos of 
Philippines, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire/Congo, President Suharto of Indonesia, 
and by former (and current) regimes in Rwanda and Nigeria, to date, at least, 
none of these countries has formally repudiated its debts.41 
C. Current Opposition to the Doctrine 
The international financial community, including IFIs, has rejected the 
validity of the odious debt doctrine. Specifically, the IMF and other NGOs have 
resisted efforts to interfere with contractual relations between a sovereign and 
its lenders by disqualifying odious debt from repayment. Representatives of the 
IMF have stated that such interference would constitute a radical change in the 
validity of creditor claims and the sanctity of contracts and that such a change 
would have adverse implications for the operation of capital markets.42 The IMF 
appears to have accepted the contentions of capital market investors that 
introducing the new risk factor of potentially having their debts deemed odious 
and thus unenforceable would undermine the efficient operation of secondary 
sovereign bond markets and would have an adverse effect on emerging-market 
borrowers to issue bonds in the primary bond markets.43 
The World Bank and the IMF consistently take the position that pressuring 
private lenders to voluntarily cancel debts would in the long run destabilize 
international lending and retard economic growth in developing countries.44 
These IFIs as well as private lenders argue that allowing subsequent regimes to 
 
 40. See Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt, 39 FIN. & DEV., June 2002, at 36; 
Report of the Reparation & Rehabilitation Committee, Reparations and the Business Sector, at 143, 
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/2_5.pdf. 
 41. For a discussion of those debts, see Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 40, at 2. 
 42. International Monetary Fund, Proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM), IMF Factsheet, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
 43. See Jack Boorman, Address at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and Int’l Affairs: Dealing Justly 
with Debt (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/043003.htm; Raghuram Rajan, 
Straight Talk Debt Relief and Growth: How to Craft an Optimal Debt Relief Proposal, FIN. & DEV., 
June 2005, at 56, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/06/straight.htm. 
 44. International Monetary Fund, supra note 42. 
04__DICKERSON.DOC 12/6/2007  8:59:55 AM 
Summer 2007] INSOLVENCY PRINCIPLES 65 
repudiate the debts of prior regimes violates the sanctity of contracts and, 
moreover, would create chaos in the international financial markets. Critics of 
the odious debt doctrine maintain that an ex post declaration that a debt is 
odious is unfair and not supported by general commercial principles since it is 
hard to anticipate which loans might be considered odious in the future. This 
risk of uncertainty would make lenders less likely to lend to the existing regime 
(even if legitimately elected) and would make lenders less likely to make loans 
to any developing nation. At least with respect to Iraq, supporters of the odious 
debt doctrine vigorously dispute this assertion, maintaining instead that the 
restructured Iraq would have little difficulty in the capital markets given the 
enormously profitable oil contracts that likely will be available in future years.45 
Even though the World Bank does not support cancellation of odious debt, 
it has recently  indicated that it will limit loans to leaders of countries deemed to 
be corrupt. That is, the Bank has indicated that it would change the way it 
designed and approved development projects for poor countries: the more 
likely it is that the money will be misused, the less likely it is that that the World 
Bank will dispense funds.46 Indeed, funds the Bank promised to lend to 
countries (including India, Chad, Argentina, and Kenya) were either suspended 
or reduced because of these concerns.47 
IV 
USING AN INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORK  
TO ANALYZE THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE 
A number of scholars and commentators, including many who are 
participating in this symposium, have proposed factors to determine whether a 
debt is odious so as to ensure that lenders can consider ex ante the risk 
associated with lending to a particular regime. They have also proposed the best 
way to structure a risk premium to compensate for an increased likelihood that 
a loan can be repudiated because of the odious nature of the debt.48 Likewise, 
scholars, economists, and those in the international human-rights community 
have suggested giving various entities the authority to determine whether a 
particular debt should be deemed odious.49 The purpose of this article, however, 
 
 45. At least with respect to Iraq, supporters of the odious debt doctrine vigorously dispute this 
assertion, maintaining instead that the restructured Iraq would have little difficulty in the capital 
markets given the enormously profitable oil contracts that likely will be available in future years. 
ADAMS, supra note 28, at ch. 17. 
 46. The World Bank, World Bank Group Historical Chronology 2005 (to September), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:
20654185~menuPK:1689560~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html (last visited Mar. 
31, 2007). 
 47. Sebatian Mallaby, Wolfowitz’s Corruption Agenda, WASH. POST., Feb. 20, 2006, at A21. 
 48. Odious Debts & State Corruption, held at Duke University School of Law, Jan. 26, 2007. 
 49. Commentators have suggested that an international NGO, a commission similar to the U.S.–
Iran Claim Commission, an international commission that operated under the purview of the United 
Nations, an independent arbitration system, or a generally respected institution, group, or person could 
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is not to propose specific insolvency procedures that should be used to 
restructure odious debts. Likewise, the article does not attempt to determine 
whether an arbitration panel, an existing nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
or international organization, or the sovereign itself should have the authority 
to determine whether any particular debt is odious. Instead, the remainder of 
this article incorporates insolvency principles into the odious debt debate in an 
attempt to respond to the claim that allowing sovereigns to repudiate odious 
debt violates the basic principle that contracts must always be honored. Thus, 
from an insolvency perspective, if an agreed-upon entity (say, Congress) applies 
clear factors (as, for example, those in a federal bankruptcy statute) to 
determine whether a creditor’s claim may be repaid, the debtor sovereign 
should be allowed to repudiate its debts only if doing so would enhance the 
sovereign’s ability to effectively reorganize itself politically and financially. 
Although this article does not attempt to specify factors that should be used 
to determine the odiousness of a debt, it explicitly rejects the argument 
advanced by some in the human-rights community that a democratically elected 
regime should have the ability to repudiate all loans simply because the loan 
was made to “illegitimate” governments50 or that the new government should be 
able to reject loans it could repay without compromising its ability to 
restructure itself financially and politically. Given the difficulties associated with 
categorizing regimes as odious or nonodious, 51 the focus of an odious-debt 
analysis in an insolvency context simply should not be whether the regime is 
democratically elected. Adopting such an approach would allow all new 
democratically elected regimes to repudiate all debts of former despotic or 
autocratic regimes. Moreover, an interpretation of the odious debt doctrine 
providing that all debts of a despotic regime could be repudiated by future 
regimes would suggest that despotic regimes never borrow funds or use those 
funds to build or repair buildings and roads, or otherwise improve the country’s 
infrastructure.52 The United Nations (U.N.) monitors nations’ activities to 
determine whether the nation (or its leaders) threatens world peace, and 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other organizations monitor 
countries accused of violating the human rights of their citizens.53 However, 
neither these nor any other independent international institution have the 
authority to proclaim that any particular regime is odious; indeed, Amnesty 
International’s governing documents provide that it does not support or oppose 
 
assess the legitimacy of debts. Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 40, at 39; Jubilee USA Network, 
supra note 25; Rajan, supra note 43. 
 50. HANLON, supra note 30. 
 51. Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious Regimes?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007). 
 52. Of course, some would suggest that future lenders would stop lending to despots if they knew 
that loans to odious leaders could be repudiated by a democratically elected government. 
 53. Amnesty International, About Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/aboutai-
index-eng (last visited Jan. 1, 2007); Human Rights Watch (HRW), About HRW, 
http://www.hrw.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2007); United Nations Security Council, Functions and 
Powers, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_functions.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
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any government or political system.54 The focus for any insolvency analysis of 
the odious debt doctrine should be on the use of the loan proceeds by the 
odious regime rather than a blanket declaration that all debts incurred by an 
odious regime can be repudiated.55 
A. Sovereigns, Individuals, and Businesses 
Unlike restructuring procedures applied to businesses or individuals under 
the Code, restructuring a sovereign’s debt poses particular challenges: turnover 
managers cannot be dispatched to manage the sovereign that has defaulted on 
its loans and creditors cannot easily repossess the collateral that secures their 
debts. Like individuals, however, a sovereign will continue to exist whether it 
repays odious debts, refuses to repay those debts, or has the debts forgiven. 
And—whether or not the sovereign is deemed to have value—a sovereign (like 
a business reorganizing under Chapter 11) that cannot pay all its debts will 
continue to exist and operate as a sovereign. For these reasons, the Code’s 
treatment of the debts of consumers and Chapter 11 debtors is instructive. 
B. Basic Insolvency Principles 
The Code’s fresh-start policy recognizes that a consumer will continue to 
exist even after he receives the bankruptcy discharge—the discharge ends the 
person’s contractual obligations, not the person himself. Likewise, Chapter 11 is 
specifically designed to help valuable albeit financially distressed businesses 
restructure their debts, then continue to operate and contribute to the 
American economy. Given these policies, not all of an individual’s assets are 
liquidated simply because she cannot pay her debts, and businesses are often 
allowed to shed their debts but not be liquidated if they are deemed to be worth 
more as an ongoing concern than their parts would be worth if sold piecemeal 
in a liquidation. 
Bankruptcy, at its core, lets debtors legally breach their contracts. Thus, 
whereas creditors are correct that the odious debt doctrine violates the sanctity 
of contracts, insolvency systems are, by design, used to reorder a debtor’s 
 
 54. Amnesty International, supra note 53. 
 55. As one commentator noted, it would be unfair to penalize investors simply because they loaned 
money to Hussein, for many of them may have relied on the December 20, 1983 picture of the special 
envoy from President Reagan—former U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld—shaking Hussein’s hand. See 
Press Release, The National Security Archive, U.S. Documents Show Embrace of Saddam Hussein in 
Early 1980s Despite Chemical Weapons, External Aggression, Human Rights Abuses (Feb. 25, 2003), 
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/press.htm. Likewise, lenders may 
generally have relied on the U.S.’s former support of Hussein, notwithstanding his brutal, despotic 
regime, in deciding to loan money to Iraq. Stated differently, whereas it is reasonable to expect that 
lenders monitor the use of the loan proceeds, short of hiring human-rights consultants to determine 
whether the existing regime is “odious,” it is unclear how the lenders would know that lending to 
Hussein was per se improper when U.S. officials supported his brutal regime (as long as he was invading 
Iran or otherwise tormenting a U.S. enemy) and encouraged lenders to invest in Iraq. Gelpern, supra 
note 26, at 412; Guy Gugliotta, Bush, Others Said to Have Repeatedly Pressed Bank to Aid Iraq, WASH. 
POST., Feb. 25, 1992, at A13. 
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contractual obligations, even if this results in a breach. The specific provisions 
that govern business reorganizations under Chapter 11 and consumer 
bankruptcies under both Chapters 7 and 13 of the Code allow businesses and 
people to restructure some debts and to repudiate all or parts of others in order 
to give the business or person a fresh start in life. For example, whereas the 
Code generally respects the sanctity of contracts and gives creditors formal 
“notice” of how their claims can be affected in a bankruptcy case, 
knowledgeable creditors understand that bankruptcy cases—especially a 
Chapter 11 reorganization—typically are a negotiated process and the result of 
the negotiation may be that they will receive less than they are entitled to under 
the terms of their contract. Indeed, large Chapter 11 reorganizations are 
essentially a series of negotiations between a Debtor in Possession (DIP), the 
DIP’s prepetition creditors and shareholders, lenders who provide financing to 
the DIP during the reorganization, and the DIP’s future lenders and owners. 
Because few claims are absolutely sacrosanct in bankruptcy, creditors know that 
certain Code provisions let the debtor, trustee in bankruptcy, and DIP alter the 
treatment the creditor’s claim would have had under applicable nonbankruptcy 
laws. 
1. Modifying Secured Claims 
Most secured creditors can expect either to be paid in full in a bankruptcy 
proceeding or to receive the collateral that secures their debts.56 Likewise, 
although the Code provides that Chapter 11 reorganization plans can modify 
the rights of the holders of secured claims, the expectation created under state 
law that a creditor will be repaid (or be allowed to seize the collateral) typically 
is not frustrated simply because the debtor sought to restructure its debts in 
bankruptcy.57 Though the Code generally respects the protections creditors 
receive under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, at times those 
protections are curtailed.  
For example, to discourage a debtor from granting “secret” liens and 
inducing other creditors to extend credit because of mistaken beliefs concerning 
the debtor’s financial situation, Article 9 provides that other creditors or bona 
fide purchasers of real property would not be bound by a creditor’s unperfected 
security interest.58 However, the security interest would be enforceable against 
the debtor. In bankruptcy cases, though, the trustee or DIP has the authority to 
avoid a creditor’s security interest if the creditor failed to properly perfect that 
interest. Thus a creditor who otherwise would have been entitled to repayment 
in full from the debtor as a secured creditor under state law could find that it 
will treated as an unsecured creditor in bankruptcy and, as a result, be repaid 
only a small percentage of its debt.59 
 
 56. 11 U.S.C. §§ 725, 1129(b)(2)(A) (2000). 
 57. Id. § 1123(b)(5). 
 58. U.C.C. § 9-317 (2001). 
 59. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000). 
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2. Modifying Unsecured Claims 
As is true outside of bankruptcy, creditors who have unsecured claims 
receive fewer protections in bankruptcy than do secured creditors. Since most 
sovereign lending is unsecured, it is especially appropriate to consider how the 
Code might modify the rights of unsecured creditors. For example, unsecured 
creditors who receive payments during the period immediately before the 
debtor files for bankruptcy can, in some instances, be required to return those 
preferential payments even though the creditor almost always would be allowed 
to keep the payments under applicable state law.60 The Code forces creditors 
who receive preferential payments to return these payments in most cases to 
avoid disrupting the Code’s payment-priority scheme.61 Although a creditor who 
is forced to disgorge a preferential payment is still entitled to seek repayment of 
the debt during the bankruptcy proceeding, depending on the debt–asset ratio 
and the terms of the Chapter 11 or 13 plan, the creditor may receive less in the 
bankruptcy case than the amount the creditor was forced to return to the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate as a preference.62 Though the preference provisions 
are designed to discourage creditors from racing to dismantle a financially ailing 
debtor as it slides into insolvency, even a creditor who does not engage in 
aggressive prepetition collection activities or does not threaten a debtor in 
order to get a preferential payment nonetheless must disgorge the payment. 
Although, in general, debtors cannot use a bankruptcy filing to rewrite their 
contracts or leases, the Code allows debtors to affect the rights of entities with 
whom they have contracted. The Code lets debtors reject (that is, refuse to 
perform) unfavorable contracts or leases.63 And, although the Code typically 
treats claims that arose after the debtor filed for bankruptcy more favorably 
than claims that arose before the filing, it provides that any damages resulting 
from the debtor’s postpetition breach of contract will be treated as if the breach 
occurred before the bankruptcy case was filed.64 Again, though the contracting 
party may have done absolutely nothing wrong, the Code gives the debtor the 
right to convert what should be a favored postpetition claim that is entitled to 
 
 60. Id. § 547(b). Under most state fraudulent transfer laws, only insiders who have knowledge that 
the debtor is insolvent will be forced to return preferential payments. See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer 
Act 5(b). 
 61. Creditors who do not improve their financial positions relative to other similarly situated 
creditors may be allowed to keep preferential payments by relying on one of the preference exceptions 
found in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c). 
 62. Upon filing a petition for relief in bankruptcy, an estate that consists of the entire debtor’s 
property, “wherever located and by whomever held,” is created. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Unsecured 
creditors—who rarely are paid in full in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy—can be especially harmed if they are 
forced to return preferential payments. For example, an unsecured creditor who exercises its states’ 
collection law remedies to, and receives payment in full of, its $100 debt during the ninety days 
preceding the bankruptcy would be forced to disgorge the $100 payment. If it receives only a ten 
percent distribution in the bankruptcy proceeding (or $10), it would feel as if not being allowed to keep 
the $90 caused it harm in an economic sense, especially since the creditor did nothing impermissible in 
obtaining full repayment before the company filed for bankruptcy. 
 63. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). 
 64. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), 502(g)(1). 
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repayment in full into a prepetition claim that likely will be paid only a small 
percentage. 
3. Eliminating Favored Claims 
Other favored creditors may face even more draconian treatment in 
bankruptcy. Former employees of companies owed pension or other employee 
benefits, creditors owed student-loan payments from debtors who cannot repay 
those debts without undue hardship, and secured creditors deemed to have 
engaged in inequitable conduct can all have their claims dramatically 
restructured, or even discharged, in a bankruptcy case. These creditors likely 
would conclude that principles embodied in the Code allowing this treatment 
violate the sanctity of their contracts by letting debtors repudiate debts that 
were otherwise valid. 
D. The Corporate Bankruptcy Model and Odious Debt 
1. “Legacy” Costs in Bankruptcy 
Businesses in industries with high labor costs increasingly use Chapter 11 to 
restructure their “legacy” costs. Legacy costs generally are defined as defined 
benefit (DB) pension obligations, retiree medical benefits, and collective-
bargaining agreements (CBAs).65 In general, businesses cannot reject a CBA, 
and they are required to continue making retiree-benefit payments during the 
course of the Chapter 11 case. Moreover, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides that a company can terminate a 
retirement plan only if it shows that it will be unable to repay all its debts under 
a Chapter 11 reorganization plan and that it would be unable to continue in 
business outside of bankruptcy.66 The Code and ERISA make it difficult for 
businesses to terminate or modify employee-benefit plans. This protects the 
retirement security of workers, advances the public policy that favors collective 
bargaining,67 and increasingly prevents businesses from shifting their liability to 
their employees onto the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).68 
 
 65. See generally Dan Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in 
Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REV. 161, 163 (1990) (arguing that the passage of Section 1114 of the 
Bankruptcy Code does little to increase the likelihood that retirees will receive benefits and pensions 
under corporate Chapter 11 restructuring). 
 66. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV) (2000). 
 67. See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 307, 314 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 68. The PBGC is a wholly owned government corporation formed to protect employees from 
employers who underfunded (or failed to fund) their pension plans. The PBGC is statutorily required 
to provide timely and uninterrupted benefit payments. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a). Though the PBGC was 
created to insure that vested participants in DB plans receive the benefits their employers promised 
them, the PBGC itself is facing a financial crisis. That is, while the PBGC had a $9.7 billion surplus in 
2000, by the end of 2005, it had almost a $25 billion deficit. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 
346 (3d Cir. 2006). This multi-billion dollar deficit has caused the PBGC to routinely oppose 
companies’ attempts to terminate their pension obligations in Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. 
Id. at 328 (PBGC opposition to termination of pension plan); In re UAL Corp. (pilots’ pension plan 
termination), 468 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2006) (PBGC opposition to termination of pension plan). As a 
result of the termination of the U.S. Airways and United Airlines’ pension plans, the PBGC had claims 
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Because federal law and policies do not favor allowing employers to 
repudiate their promises to their current or former employees, a business 
attempting to reorganize under Chapter 11 may reject a CBA69 or modify 
retiree benefits70 only if it shows that these changes are necessary for the 
business to reorganize, if it assures that all affected parties are treated fairly and 
equitably, and if the treatment of the legacy costs is “clearly favored by the 
balance of the equities.”71 In determining whether the balance of the equities 
favors terminating or modifying the employee-benefit claims, courts consider a 
number of factors, including whether the debtor is likely to liquidate if it cannot 
modify its debts to the employees, whether other creditors’ claims will be 
harmed if the legacy costs remain in place, the good or bad faith of the parties 
in dealing with the debtor’s financial situation, and the relative abilities of the 
various parties to spread the costs associated with maintaining (or modifying) 
the legacy costs.72 
Businesses that can show they cannot successfully reorganize and compete 
in the marketplace unless they terminate (or modify) their legacy costs likely 
would be allowed to breach their contractual promises to make future 
compensation payments to their employees (in the form of pensions or retiree 
medical benefits). Indeed, over the last two decades, steel and airline 
companies73 have used Chapter 11 to terminate or severely reduce their legacy 
costs74 even though their employees had already agreed to lower wages in the 
past, likely in exchange for receiving these future benefits.75 Courts have 
increasingly allowed large airlines and steel companies to breach their CBAs or 
to otherwise terminate their pension plans when the company proved (or at 
least asserted) that it could not get debt or equity financing to reorganize and  
emerge from bankruptcy.76 Courts appear willing to let businesses use Chapter 
 
of $9.7 billion. Because of unfunded benefit guarantees, it is projected that the PBGC will run out of 
money by 2022. Julie Kosterlitz, Pinched Promises, NAT’L. J., Sept. 3, 2005, at 2650–51. 
 69. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000). 
 70. Id. § 1114. 
 71. Id. § 1114(g). Debtors are also required to send the retirees’ representative a proposal that 
explains how the debtor intends to treat the retirees’ benefits claim and to make a good faith effort to 
confer with the representative to discuss the proposed modification. In re Delta Air Lines, 342 B.R. 
685, 693–94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing requirements). 
 72. In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 307, 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 73. Bethlehem Steel, LTV, National Steel, Kaiser Aluminum Corp., U.S. Airways, Delta Airlines, 
and United Airlines are among the companies who have used bankruptcy to reduce their legacy costs. 
Since 2000, there have been twenty-two airline bankruptcy filings. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, COMMERCIAL AVIATION: BANKRUPTCY AND PENSION PROBLEMS ARE SYMPTOMS OF 
UNDERLYING STRUCTURAL ISSUES 3 (2005). 
 74. See, e.g., In re Delta Air Lines, 342 B.R. at 685 (seeking rejection of CBA with flight 
attendants); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006) (seeking termination of pension 
plan); In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 307 (seeking rejection of CBA); In re U.S. Airways 
Group, Inc., 296 B.R. at 734 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (seeking termination of pilots’ pension plan). See 
Kosterlitz, supra note 68, at 2651. 
 75. See Dan Keating, Why the Bankruptcy Reform Act Left Labor Legacy Costs Alone, 71 MO. L. 
REV. 985 (2006). 
 76. In re U.S. Airways, 296 B.R. at 734; In re Wire Rope Corp. of Am., Inc., 287 B.R. 771 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 2002). 
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11 to repudiate their labor obligations because the only other option is 
liquidating the company, which would then terminate the wages and benefits 
for all the employees. 
2. Odious Debt Analogy 
The core “business” of a sovereign is to protect the safety and provide for 
the general welfare of its citizens—not just to have a high gross domestic 
product.77 The odious debt doctrine is usually discussed using human-rights or 
social-justice terms. However, the essence of the doctrine is the desire to 
prevent a financially strapped nation from being forced to continue to struggle 
to repay loans that were not used to benefit the nation or its citizens. Even if it 
were theoretically possible for a successor regime to use the country’s resources 
to repay odious debts over an extended period, the doctrine would excuse the 
successor from repaying those debts if doing so would significantly restrict the 
nation’s ability to reorganize financially (by paying old debts and attracting new 
investments) and civically (by continuing to provide essential services to its 
citizens). It is consistent with general insolvency principles, policies expressed in 
Code provisions, and the odious debt doctrine to allow a nation saddled with 
enormous debts that provided little (or no) benefits to the citizens of the nation 
to repudiate those debts if repaying them would render a nation functionally 
insolvent and unable to perform the critical functions involved in governing. 
United, Delta, Northwest, other airlines, and steel companies ostensibly 
could have maintained their legacy costs outside of bankruptcy if they had been 
prepared to radically reduce corporate earnings (or, the salaries of their 
managers). If these companies had agreed to radically restructure their 
businesses and stop flying planes or melting metal they perhaps could have 
maintained their legacy costs for a smaller workforce. Just as airlines and steel 
companies argued that forcing them to maintain their existing levels of 
employee benefits would radically undermine their reorganization efforts, a 
new political regime attempting to reorganize and restructure the country’s 
debts justifiably could argue that repaying odious debts far into the future 
would undermine its restructuring efforts. 
In the case of Iraq, a new government cannot be a model for responsible 
government in the Middle East, have credibility with its own oppressed 
populations, re-enter the international community, or attract new investments if 
that government either must tax its citizens, be rendered incapable of investing 
in the country’s physical infrastructure, or be unable to provide crucial services 
to the Iraqi people. Because calculating the amount of Iraq’s remaining 
unrestructured debts owed to non-Paris Club states and its ultimate war debts is 
not possible, it is difficult to determine whether Iraq has the capacity to repay 
 
 77. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mons. D’Ivernois (Feb. 6, 1975), in THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 297 (Lipscomb ed., 1903) (“[I]t is to secure our just rights that we resort to 
government at all.”); H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
651, 662 (1995). 
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those debts. Iraq’s oil fields are still quite profitable but currently are in a state 
of disrepair. It seems likely, though, that the debts could be repaid if some (or 
all) future oil revenues were transferred to existing creditors for an extended 
period. However, diverting these revenues to repay those debts might create a 
debt overhang that discourages new investment and thus hampers the ability of 
the new government to attract new capital. 
Countries, like Iraq, that are saddled with enormous debts that fairly could 
be construed as odious likely could repay those debts if they neglect or ignore 
the health, safety, or educational needs of their citizens. But, just as the airline 
and steel companies that filed for bankruptcy to shed their legacy costs would 
not have emerged from bankruptcy and been able to perform many of their 
prepetition critical functions, a nation saddled with enormous debts that 
provided little (or no) benefits to its citizens will be unable to perform the 
critical functions involved in governing: to provide security, to build and 
maintain physical infrastructure, and to provide other basic services for its 
citizens. 
Forcing a country to repay odious debts over an extended period might 
render it politically insolvent, even if it remained balance-sheet solvent. Letting 
a sovereign repudiate odious debts that hamper the country’s political and 
financial recovery would be consistent with insolvency principles generally, and 
with the Code’s treatment of legacy costs specifically: only a sovereign that 
could show that it could not overcome its financial crisis and perform the 
business of being a sovereign should be able to repudiate its debts. The 
sovereign also would need to show that, in general, it is treating all creditors 
fairly and equitably. Moreover, like businesses seeking to reduce or eliminate 
their legacy costs, sovereigns would need to show that the creditors could 
spread the costs associated with odious debt repudiation better than citizens 
could bear the costs associated with repaying the debts. Finally, just as courts 
consider whether parties have made good faith efforts to address how a firm’s 
legacy costs have affected the firm’s financial condition and how to restructure 
those costs, the parties’ good faith also should be considered when deciding 
whether a sovereign should be forced to repay odious debts. Bad faith creditors 
would be those who knew or should have known that the odious loans were not 
used to benefit the citizens and that, as a result, the loans would worsen the 
sovereign’s financial situation while providing no (or few) benefits to the 
sovereign. It would be consistent with insolvency principles that govern the 
treatment of legacy costs to permit sovereigns to repudiate odious debts to 
creditors who have not acted in good faith. 
Of course, a sovereign’s decision to repudiate prior odious debts might 
affect the sovereign’s future ability to borrow or otherwise attract new 
investments. However, if—as is true with businesses—lenders are unwilling to 
provide future capital to a sovereign because the odious debts create a debt 
overhang, sovereigns should be allowed to significantly modify or repudiate the 
odious debts in order to give potential lenders or investors an incentive to 
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provide future capital. Indeed, letting sovereigns repudiate odious debts might 
actually give new lenders an incentive to lend. That is, if lenders understand 
that they can in effect eliminate or subordinate old debts by refusing to lend to 
a financially distressed sovereign unless the sovereign repudiates the odious 
debts or unless they are given a higher priority in payment (or a lien in 
sovereign assets), both current and potential future creditors may be more 
willing to lend to a sovereign who chooses to repudiate. 
In short, allowing sovereigns to repudiate odious debts if repaying those 
debts potentially thwarts the sovereign’s ability to effectively reorganize 
financially and politically is consistent with the Code’s treatment of legacy costs 
for businesses that attempt to reorganize in Chapter 11. 
E. The Consumer-Bankruptcy Model and Odious Debt 
1. Student Loans 
Some businesses that have filed for bankruptcy have gross revenues larger 
than some countries’ gross domestic products.78 The most obvious way to “fit” 
the odious debt concept within an insolvency framework would thus seem to be 
by making analogies to business reorganizations. Yet, despite the myriad 
differences between financially strapped people and financially troubled 
sovereigns, people and sovereigns share one primary characteristic: both will 
continue to exist regardless of whether they repay their debts or how they 
restructure those debts upon default. Thus, as another participant in this 
symposium has noted,79 analyzing the treatment of sovereign debts using a 
consumer bankruptcy lens also can be instructive. 
The Code’s treatment of student loans in consumer bankruptcies provides 
perhaps the strongest consumer-bankruptcy analogy justifying sovereign 
repudiation of odious debts. In general, educational loans are not dischargeable, 
and student-loan creditors are favored in bankruptcy.80 Notwithstanding the 
 
 78. For example, in November 2006—while Delta Air Lines was reorganizing under Chapter 11—
Delta had U.S. $2.7 billion in unrestricted cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments. Delta’s 
November 2006 net loss was $49 million and its November 2006 operating income was $52 million. 
Delta, Delta Air Lines Reports Monthly Results for November 2006, http://news.delta.com/ 
article_display.cfm?article_id=10501 (last visited Dec. 29, 2006). In contrast, the 2005 Gross Domestic 
Product (and the projected 2006 GDP) of Guinea-Bissau—a country that is listed as a heavily indebted 
poor country that is eligible for HIPC Initiative assistance from the IMF—was less than a quarter of a 
billion. International Monetary Fund, Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last visited June 30, 2007);  USDA 
Economic Research Service, Real Historical & Projected Gross Domestic Product and Growth Rate of 
GDP for Baseline Countries/Regions 2000-2017, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/Data/Projected RealGDPValues.xls (last visited June 
30, 2007). 
 79. Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 
EMORY L. J. 1159, 1163 (2004). 
 80. Indeed, a recent amendment to the Bankruptcy Code expands the protections these creditors 
receive. That is, until 2005, only loans made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit or 
nonprofit institution were protected from discharge. Congress amended the Code to expand those 
protections to for-profit lenders. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2000). 
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favorable treatment student loans tend to receive, debtors can discharge all or 
part of student-loan debts if requiring repayment would impose an undue 
hardship on the debtor or the debtor’s dependents.81 
Most courts have adopted a three-part undue hardship test that considers 
whether (1) based on current income and expenses, the debtor can maintain a 
“minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents and also repay the 
loans; (2) additional circumstances exist indicating that the debtor’s financial 
state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment 
period; and (3) the debtor has made a good faith effort to repay the loans.82 
Other courts use a “totality of the circumstances” test that considers the 
debtor’s past, current, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; the 
amount of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents’ reasonable, necessary living 
expenses; and any other relevant facts or circumstances unique to the particular 
case.83 These courts have not precisely defined the minimal standard of living a 
debtor and her dependents are entitled to in bankruptcy. They agree, though, 
that the debtor must have sufficient resources to satisfy the need for food, 
shelter, clothing, and medical treatment.84 Courts routinely stress that “undue 
hardship” stops short of debtors’ having to live in abject poverty in order to 
discharge their student loans.85 
2. Odious Debt Analogy 
Whereas the undue-hardship test is designed to be a rigorous one that 
prevents most debtors from discharging their loans, it nonetheless could be used 
to justify allowing a sovereign to discharge odious debts if forcing it to repay 
those debts would cause an undue hardship for the debtor (the sovereign) or for 
the debtor’s dependents (the citizens). An undue-hardship test allowing a 
country to repudiate odious debts would need to take into consideration the 
sovereign’s past, current, and reasonably reliable future financial resources—
most likely its future export revenue and any possible future loans, investments, 
or tax revenue. Just as courts consider the amount of a debtor’s dependents’ 
reasonable, necessary living expenses when deciding whether to discharge a 
student loan, whether to allow a sovereign to repudiate odious debts might 
depend on the hardship debt repayment would have on its citizens. A sovereign 
that could show that repaying the odious debts would make attracting future 
investment impossible should be allowed to discharge the debt to avoid 
imposing an undue hardship on the citizens of the country. Finally, just as 
 
 81. Saxman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. BJR Corp. (In re Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 82. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 464 F.3d 878, 881–82 (9th Cir. 2006). Most 
circuit courts have adopted this three-part test, originally applied in Brunner v. New York State Higher 
Educ. Svcs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 83. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 84. Gill v. Nelnet Loan Servs., Inc. (In re Gill), 326 B.R. 611, 626 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005). 
 85. Hornsby v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 
1998); Doe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Doe), 323 B.R. 111, 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(rejecting the argument that undue hardship should be assessed based on federal poverty guidelines); 
Shadwick v. United States Dep’t. of Educ. (In re Shadwick), 341 B.R. 6, 11 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006). 
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bankruptcy courts deciding whether to discharge a student loan consider other 
relevant facts or circumstances unique to that case, a sovereign should be able 
to show that the debts incurred did not benefit the citizens or that the loan 
proceeds had been looted or used for illegal purposes to support allowing it to 
repudiate those odious debts. 
Some countries, like Iraq, might have significant future earning capacity 
based on oil or other exports. If a sovereign’s inability to repay its debts does 
not appear likely to persist for the entire loan-repayment period, it should be 
allowed to partially repudiate only some of the odious loans or to partially 
repudiate only part of all odious loans. For example, it would be appropriate to 
allow the sovereign to repudiate penalties or interest on arrears imposed 
because of trade or other economic sanctions imposed against a brutal regime if 
the sovereign proved that it could not repay all odious debts and penalties 
without jeopardizing its ability to restructure financially and to provide basic 
services for its citizens. 
F. The Principle of Equitable Subordination and Odious Debt 
Finally, bankruptcy courts can reorder the priority of payment of creditors’ 
claims, or can invalidate a lender’s security interest in collateral, under the 
theory of equitable subordination. This theory, codified in Section 510(c) of the 
Code, allows courts to subordinate a creditor’s claim if the court determines 
that the creditor engaged in inequitable or fraudulent conduct, that the 
misconduct harmed other creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the 
individual creditor, and if equitably subordinating the claim is not inconsistent 
with the Code generally.86 Equitable subordination is an unusual remedy that is 
used only in limited circumstances and most often triggered when the creditor is 
an insider. Although the misconduct needed to subordinate claims of 
noninsiders is greater than the misconduct necessary to subordinate insider 
claims, noninsiders also risk having their claims equitably subordinated if their 
conduct amounted to fraud, overreaching, or spoliation.87 Courts interpreting 
the theory have determined that they can subordinate a creditor’s claim even if 
the creditor’s misconduct does not relate to its claim in the bankruptcy case.88 
Using the doctrine of equitable subordination to justify the repudiation of 
odious debts would give lenders an incentive to engage in due diligence before 
making a loan and then to monitor the use of the loan. Creditors who are owed 
odious debts should be allowed to demonstrate that they took reasonable steps 
to ensure that the loan proceeds were being used to benefit the nation’s citizens 
and that the funds were not being diverted to be used by despotic leaders, their 
friends, political supporters, or their families. Sovereign debts incurred as the 
 
 86. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2000); In re Racing Servs., Inc., 340 B.R. 73, 76 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); In 
re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 744 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 87. In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc., 161 B.R. 107, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 88. In re Racing Servs., 340 B.R. at 77–78; Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent 
Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007). 
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result of bribes, kickbacks, or the like are easily analogized to claims that are 
equitably subordinated in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
Even if the lender did not itself engage in inequitable conduct, sovereigns 
should be allowed to repudiate odious debts. This debt repudiation is consistent 
with the doctrine of equitable subordination if the lender knew or should have 
known that the former regime was not using those funds for the benefit of the 
citizens because the creditor’s misconduct (here, lending funds that would be 
knowingly used for illegitimate purposes) gave it an unfair advantage over other 
creditors or generally harmed other creditors. Although a sovereign’s citizens 
do not have a traditional lending relationship with the nation-state, they are in 
effect its creditors because they essentially serve as guarantors of the 
sovereign’s debts. Citizens effectively guarantee the sovereign’s debts because, 
upon default, the sovereign will be forced to either tax them to repay the debts 
or forgo providing basic services to them if the sovereign cannot afford to repay 
old debts, obtain new capital, or provide services to its citizens. Since they 
would be harmed if the sovereign repaid the odious debts, they arguably satisfy 
the requirement that other creditors are harmed by the inequitable conduct of 
the creditor whose claim is being subordinated. 
Allowing sovereigns to repudiate debts that are not clearly illegal but that 
could nonetheless be deemed odious should, like the subordination of debts in 
Chapter 11, be a rare occurrence. Any ex post declarations that odious debts 
will be equitably subordinated (to old nonodious debts or to future nonodious 
loans) might increase creditors’ reluctance to lend to developing countries or 
may increase the costs of those loans. This is a legitimate concern, as is the 
concern that imposing additional requirements on lenders to monitor the use of 
the loan proceeds will increase the cost of borrowing for sovereigns. While 
there is no universally recognized list of “odious regimes,” it is disingenuous to 
suggest that international lenders have no way to determine whether a regime is 
engaging in activities that harm its citizens and thus making an inappropriate 
use of loan proceeds. International organizations, including the United Nations 
(through its Security Council) routinely condemn nations that have despotic, 
brutal leaders or that otherwise engage in brutal practices. To alleviate the 
concerns that these ex post declarations will increase the cost of credit, a 
successor government should not be allowed to repudiate all loans to such 
regimes. However, the regimes’ lenders can reasonably be on notice of the 
international community’s view of the regime and thus be prepared to increase 
their monitoring of the loan proceeds. Moreover, just as the World Bank has 
recently created a list of countries with corrupt governments to whom it has 
refused to lend, it is not unreasonable to expect sovereign lenders to modify 
their lending practices to help ensure that they do not knowingly make loans to 
sovereigns who use loan proceeds for reasons that do not benefit the 
sovereigns’ citizens. 
With respect to Iraq, lenders knew or could have known with a reasonable 
monitoring process that Hussein was using the loan proceeds for reasons other 
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than those provided in the lending agreement. Such lenders should not have 
been surprised if their loans were radically restructured or forgiven altogether. 
Similarly, such lenders should not have been surprised to find that they would 
not be repaid since it was common knowledge that Iraq had long refused to 
repay old debts unless the creditors agreed to make large new loans.89 Perhaps 
most importantly, since most of Iraq’s lenders were other nation-states—many 
in the Middle East—it is simply inconceivable that they did not know (or at 
least have reason to suspect) that the proceeds of some of their loans were 
being used to benefit Hussein, to finance the invasion of Iran (or Kuwait), to 
murder political opponents in Iraq, or to perpetuate genocide. Indeed, for at 
least the last thirty years, the international community was on notice that the 
Hussein regime consistently and persistently violated the economic, social, and 
cultural rights of a significant portion of the Iraqi citizenry. Similarly, it would 
have been consistent with the doctrine of equitable subordination to 
subordinate the loans made by nations who lent to South Africa during the 
apartheid era. When the United Nations Security Council imposed trade 
sanctions on South Africa, lenders should have been on notice that at least 
some of the money they lent to the apartheid government was used to violate 
the human rights of black South Africans. Lenders who continued to loan 
money to the old South African government through the 1980s (as many did) 
could not reasonably claim that they lacked notice of the potential odiousness 
of those post-sanction loans.90 
V 
CONCLUSION 
For now, the international financial community and creditor nations like the 
United States have refused to acknowledge—much less publicly endorse—the 
odious debt doctrine. Nonetheless, the Bush Administration helped convince 
other nations to forgive billions of Iraq’s debts based, in part, on the 
Administration’s concern that Hussein used the money to buy arms or build 
castles. The persistent push by the human-rights community for formal 
acceptance of the doctrine, coupled with public statements by politicians in the 
United States and abroad that arguably support the doctrine, will continue to 
influence financial restructurings involving sovereigns who inherit odious debts 
and should make lenders skeptical when loaning funds to countries who have 
brutal, repressive regimes. Just as the parties to an out-of-court debt 
restructuring negotiate in the shadow of bankruptcy, the threat of having debts 
 
 89. Patrick Cockburn, The Arms for Iraq Scandal: Oil Price Collapse and Iran War Prompted 
Credit Crisis, THE INDEP., Dec. 12, 1992, at 8; Gugliotta, supra note 55. 
 90. The U.N. Resolution urged all member States “to induce transnational corporations, banks and 
financial institutions to withdraw effectively from South Africa and prevent them from: (i) Investing in 
South Africa . . . ; (iii) Engaging in commercial transactions with South Africa; [and] (iv) Granting 
loans and credits to South Africa.” G.A. Res. 42/23, ¶ B1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/23 (Nov. 20, 1987), 
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/a42r023.htm. 
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repudiated because of the odious debt doctrine likely will continue to cause 
lenders to forgive such debts even if they do not think they have a moral or 
philosophical duty—and no actual legal duty—to do so. 
